Journalism and defamation, and if France was based in Quebec?
By Marc-François Bernier (Ph. D.)
Chair of Journalism Ethics Research (CYR), University of Ottawa (Canada).
The author is a visiting professor at the University Paul Cézanne-(Aix-en-Provence) within a year of research and teaching.
In open and democratic societies, defamation of individuals is an issue facing courts only civilians. The controversial arrest of journalist Liberation , Vittorio de Fillipi recalls that there are ways to punish non-criminal abuse of press. If France wants to modernize its way of dealing with libel suits, it could very well be based in Quebec.
course, journalists can no longer claim any rights or freedoms as any other citizen. But they may be entitled to a legal mechanism different when their professional activities require them to defend themselves against libel. This is what happens over many years in Quebec, under the civil code that we inherited from France, but was influenced by our Anglo-Saxon.
In Quebec, the general state of the law is as follows. To be a journalist convicted of defamation, it must meet three essential factors. Professional misconduct on the part of the journalist, damage (whether material or moral) in its "victim" and a causal link between these two facts. This means that the mere injury to a third party is not automatically punished, because it requires proof that the journalist has committed misconduct which would cause the damage. To determine
if there is fault, the judges evaluate whether the journalist sued for libel has complied with the rules of art recognized by journalists. These rules of art in the form of normative texts such as Handbook of Journalistic Ethics of the Professional Federation of Quebec Journalists, Rights and Responsibilities of the Press Council of Quebec Press, or the journalistic standards and practices Radio-Canada. Other ethical texts can be mobilized, as several media outlets have adopted such documents in recent years.
In light of the evidence established by the parties, judges will evaluate the articles and reports implicated in the light of these ethical standards, taking into account the content of reports, the methodology of the journalistic investigation and the context of the publication, as decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004.
This means that journalists have no obligation of result, but they have an obligation of means. They must take all reasonable steps to make sure that the information they publish meeting the standards of quality information as defined by the various legislative texts. To be quality, this information should be public and truthful (rigor and accuracy are key criteria), it must be impartial, obtained and disseminated in a fair and honest. The texts state ethical practices consistent with these ethical principles.
Thus, there may not be a journalist convicted for publishing false information if he proves that he was conscientious and observed the rules of art. Indeed, journalism is not a perfect science, and honest mistakes can happen that one must to tolerate nor disrupt unnecessarily the freedom of press or risk inhibit journalists in their quest for the truth public.
In other cases, a journalist (and the media) may be ordered to compensate his victim even if the information published is true, because it has not been recognized in the public interest (invasion of privacy by example) or because it obscures important facts that distort reality (lack of fairness or integrity, for example).
Since civil court judges are not necessarily familiar with the ethical and professional standards of journalism, experts are often involved in court to give their opinion as to which journalistic practices are the subject of the trial. This therefore gives rise to a debate between experts, but judges are not required to withhold an opinion rather than another. Sometimes they reject both views or select only certain aspects they take back for themselves, without naming the expert who made them. In other cases, they quote passages of the expert report or testimony to support their decision.
It must be recognized that Quebec's model suffers from flaws of civil justice in general. There is first the problem of access to justice. The costs of these lawsuits are entirely borne by the parties, which can quickly represent costs amounting to hundreds of thousands of euros, while convictions, only cash, rarely the victims of defamation to their costs. In this regard, the media as media companies are better positioned to defend themselves than those who claim to be victims of defamation and have limited resources.
Moreover, it may take between two and five years before a further obtains a first trial, in Superior Court. This ruling may be brought before the Court of Appeal and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada. A civil suit for defamation can last up to ten years and cost a small fortune on a litigant who has the courage and determination to go through the legal process. These defects Quebec model, however, can easily be mitigated if the political will is the appointment.
Moreover, this model has the great merit of insisting on quality of the journalistic process and respect for professional ethics, that no responsible journalist can deny. It removes political considerations in bringing the debate on the quality of the journalistic process, regardless of reputation or status of one who claims to be victim of defamation.
In the French context, however, it will probably need to modernize and clarify the normative order that judges may rely on explicit ethical and operational règes instead of vague statements of principle found in charters. In this chapter, the Anglo-Saxon media offer multiple copies of codes of ethics, both rigorous and flexible.
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